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Islam and the Global Society: A Religious  
Approach to Modernity 
Charles McDaniel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the post-September 11 world fixated on terrorism and the 
war to combat it, the larger question concerning the compatibility of 
Islam with a global culture that is rapidly enveloping the Muslim 
world has gained increasing attention from Western journalists, 
academics, and foreign policy analysts. Newspaper columnists such as 
Cal Thomas and William Safire have issued credible claims that, in 
the words of Thomas, “the growing number of extremists who take 
the Koran as a declaration of war against all non-Muslims has 
become a clear and present danger, not only overseas, but 
increasingly in our own country.”1 Similarly, Western scholars such 
as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington2 have speculated that the 
cultural rift between Muslim and Western societies is too great to be 
bridged by the simple expansion of material affluence and the export 
of liberal conceptions of human rights. Huntington, in The Clash of 
 
* J.M. Dawson Institute, Baylor University. The author would like to thank Baylor University 
graduate students Sabrina Neff and Michael Sullivan for their research efforts in the 
development of this paper. 
 1. Cal Thomas, Will They Fool Us Twice?, at http://www.townhall.com/ 
columnists/calthomas/ct20011003.shtml (Oct. 3, 2001); see also William Safire, For a Muslim 
Legion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A23. 
 2. According to Lewis, it is the “attraction” of Western values and affluence that have 
energized fundamentalist movements in Islam and contributed to the divide between cultures. 
He states:  
More than ever before it is Western capitalism and democracy that provide an 
authentic and attractive alternative to traditional ways of thought and life [in 
Muslim society]. Fundamentalist leaders are not mistaken in seeing in Western 
civilization the greatest challenge to the way of life that they wish to retain or restore 
for their people. [Moreover, f]rom constitutions to Coca-Cola, from tanks and 
television to T-shirts, the symbols and artifacts, and through them the ideas, of the 
West have retained—even strengthened—their appeal.  
Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1990, at 47, available at http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); see also Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22. 
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Civilizations?, insists that humanity’s future battleground “will not 
be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world 
affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur 
between nations and groups of different civilizations.”3 
Huntington’s thesis is especially sobering to an intellectual 
community grappling with this supposed chasm that exists between 
Muslim and Western cultures, the nations of which are seemingly at 
odds over first principles.4 The colliding civilizations theory insists 
that long-employed instruments of Western “paternalism”—the 
expansion of markets, the export of democratic ideals, and the 
promotion of human rights—are ineffectual, or perhaps even 
counterproductive, in resolving intercultural problems with the 
Muslim world. Bernard Lewis explored the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism as a consequence of Muslim culture’s growing 
attraction to Western values as far back as 1990 in his essay The Roots 
of Muslim Rage. In this essay Lewis suggested that 
Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the 
otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim 
masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and 
loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs, their 
aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their 
livelihood.5 
Yet one must question whether the responses of fundamentalist 
groups are in any way representative of the broad spectrum of 
Muslim society respecting the encroachments of modernity.6 
 
 3. Huntington, supra note 2, at 22. 
 4. Huntington identifies some of the principles over which civilizations clash: 
“different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the 
citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the 
relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.” 
Id. at 25. 
 5. Lewis, supra note 2, at 47, 59. For an excellent survey of books engaging the 
clashing civilizations thesis, see Coming to Grips With Jihad, ATLANTIC, at http://www. 
theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/jihad.htm (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 6. Lewis himself recognizes: 
The Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of the West, nor have the 
Muslim regions of the Third World been the most passionate and the most extreme 
in their hostility. There are still significant numbers, in some quarters perhaps a 
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Globalization, as one of the principal “encroachments,” encompasses 
those processes in the interaction of human cultures that have 
succeeded in compressing and intensifying humankind’s knowledge 
of the world such that traditional boundaries and the separations 
created by polities, and even those divisions resulting from the 
physical properties of space and time, are increasingly 
inconsequential.7 The question addressed here is whether this 
simultaneous compression and intensification of knowledge and 
activities on a global scale, and the consequences thereof, is in any 
way incompatible with the Islamic worldview. 
The clash of civilizations thesis assumes much about Muslim 
attitudes toward the rise of a global society, and it may exaggerate 
the fundamental nature of perceived incompatibilities between 
Muslim and Western culture. Consequently, the danger of a self-
fulfilling prophecy exists with regard to Islam and the global 
community in that the presumed gulf between cultures may well be 
realized if those presumptions harden attitudes between Islamic 
nations and the rest of the world. Thus, while several conflicts such 
as the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire can be traced to particular 
historical, political, and geographical circumstances, future global 
conflicts could arise without any such justification. The mere 
existence of misperceptions between Islam and the West may be 
sufficient to inflame hatred and precipitate conflict. 
At the very least, Western scholars are obligated to discern 
accurate views on the globalization phenomenon from a cross-
section of Islamic leaders, scholars, and businesspersons. Western 
critics of Muslim society in particular must analyze attitudes and 
behavior across the social and economic strata of Islamic societies to 
 
majority, of Muslims with whom we share certain basic cultural and moral, social 
and political, beliefs and aspirations . . . .  
Lewis, supra note 2, at 48. 
 7. This definition of globalization expands on one located on the website of the 
Globalization Research Center of the University of South Florida: “[G]lobalization refers to 
the worldwide compression of space and time and the intensification of consciousness about 
the world as a whole.” Globalization Research Center Website, at http://www.cas.usf.edu/ 
GlobalResearch/ (last modified Feb. 28, 2003). Attempting a more comprehensive definition, 
Roger Scruton notes: “Globalization does not mean merely the expansion of communications, 
contacts, and trade around the globe. It means the transfer of social, economic, political, and 
juridical power to global organizations, by which I mean organizations that are located in no 
particular sovereign jurisdiction, and governed by no particular territorial law.” Roger Scruton, 
The West and the Rest, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ 
comment-scruton092302.asp (Sept. 23, 2002). 
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adequately assess if and where incompatibilities exist. More diligent 
scholarship would help to alleviate the stereotyping of Islam that has 
been perpetuated by non-Muslims on the basis of uninformed 
interpretations of the Quran and misperceptions about the Islamic 
faith generally. Indeed, it is just as misleading for a Christian to 
interpret and declare certain tenets of the Quran to be at odds with 
global culture as it would be for a Muslim to use select scripture 
from the Bible (e.g., the prohibition against usury) for the purpose 
of declaring Christianity incompatible with the modern industrial 
societies of the West.8 
This Essay attempts to distill and analyze responses from 
representatives of various Islamic communities to the globalization of 
human culture. Specifically, it seeks to identify which, if any, of the 
cultural phenomena commonly associated with globalization are 
fundamentally at odds with the teachings of the Quran or the 
principles of social morality and organization common to most 
Islamic societies. To better facilitate investigation, the body of this 
Essay is divided into four principal sections: Part II explores the 
economic aspects of globalization that influence Muslim societies; 
Part III discusses political globalization and Western perceptions of 
Islamic resistance to democratic principles; Part IV examines Muslim 
attitudes toward an evolving international standard for human rights; 
and, Part V offers some reflections and suggests that Islam’s 
encounter with the global society is not as “inherently” contentious 
as many Western critics have portrayed. In fact, the responses of 
Muslim communities, even many fundamentalist ones, to the 
globalization phenomenon are in certain ways similar to the struggles 
of early American society with principles of social organization as 
they emerged with the “new economics” of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, the political ideals of Whiggery, and the evolutionary 
and often painful development of a “modern” theory of human 
 
 8. Swiss National Bank General Thomas Moser notes:  
“All of the three legal codes of the Old Testament, the ‘Code of the Covenant,’ the 
‘Law of Holiness,’ and the ‘Deuteronomic Code,’ contain a law prohibiting the 
lending on interest whereby the prohibition in the ‘Code of the Covenant’ in the 
book of Exodus is generally agreed to be the oldest.”  
Thomas Moser, The Old Testament Anti-Usury Laws Reconsidered: The Myth of Tribal 
Brotherhood, Social Science Research Network Electronic Library, at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/delivery.cfm/9703041.pdf ?abstractid=41844 (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). 
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rights.9 Part VI follows with a brief conclusion that the perceived 
clash of civilizations is in fact an encounter between cultures at 
different stages in their respective developments; yet, it also suggests 
that both Western and Islamic societies have the ability to inform the 
other and potentially to reveal each other’s shortcomings in their 
respective conceptions of progress and justice. 
II. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
To date, the greatest cultural impacts among myriad phenomena 
associated with globalization have been economic—the proliferation 
of transnational corporations, the rise of brand consciousness in the 
developing world, the diffusion of manufacturing processes around 
the globe, and the rising dominance of an ethos of consumption. 
Economic globalization is perhaps most prominent because of its 
brashness; it is in-your-face globalization—a form that requires an 
immediate response at the level of the individual (to consume or to 
sell one’s services)—and it is a type of globalizing influence that 
more easily circumvents the traditional physical and ideological 
boundaries of the state by facilitating value transference through the 
ubiquitous instrument of the market. Thus, economic globalization 
confronts Muslims, as all people, not only with consumption choices 
but with value choices as well. Its associated technologies are rife 
with value implications, as many Westerners have discovered in the 
development of markets for human fertility services, genetically 
engineered foods, human organs, pornographic commodities, and 
other religiously, morally, and ecologically controversial products 
and services. These and many other value-shaping commodities are 
increasingly marketed on a global scale. 
Yet a teleological disconnect perhaps has contributed most to the 
separation between Islamic and Western cultures over economic 
globalization and, more generally, economic philosophy. Timur 
Kuran neatly summarizes the attitude that has divided Muslims from 
 
 9. Legal historian John Witte explores the impact of “diverse ideological movements, 
in various academic disciplines and social circles throughout Europe and North America” in 
the formation of the United States in JOHN WITTE, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 31 (2000). For Witte’s 
view of the struggle for first principles in the early American nation and especially the 
evolutionary nature of the ideal of “religious liberty” in the American experience, see Chapter 
One, “The American Experiment in Historical Context” and Chapter Two, “The Theology 
and Politics of the Religion Clauses.” 
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non-Muslims regarding economics where he states, “the main 
purpose of Islamic economics is not to improve economic 
performance,”10 a point completely lost on most Western readers. 
The market, or suq in Islamic societies, is much more than an 
institution for the efficient exchange of commodities. Rather it serves 
to reinforce societal values and traditions and, perhaps most 
importantly, the ordering of those traditions in a very distinct 
hierarchy. Michael Gilsenan infers from the location of the market in 
Muslim villages—most often adjacent to a mosque—a symbolism 
that offers a critical insight into Islamic culture. The criticality of 
“space” and “symbols” to Muslims insists that the physical 
relationship between mosque and market is not coincidental but 
rather signifies that commercial transactions take place “within” the 
larger and greater context of an Islamic order built on the teachings 
of the Quran.11 Moreover, it signifies that market ethics must remain 
subordinate to the doctrine and moral principles of Islam. Gilsenan 
gives the following explanation of the cultural differences between 
Muslim and non-Muslim societies12 regarding the role of the market 
(and concurrently offers a not-so-subtle critique of the Western 
view): 
[T]he suq seldom ever has a singularly economic quality and . . . it 
rather might be seen in its turn as an extension of life in the 
adjacent mosque. For village and tribal markets . . . are not just 
arenas into which everyone leaps, economic fists at the ready for 
battle, where anything goes in terms of bargaining, self-interest, 
profit calculation, and getting as much out of the other fellow as 
possible. The suq is intensely personal and social. Relations of 
 
 10. Timur Kuran, The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality, 86 AM. ECON. REV., 
May 1996, at 438, 438 (emphasis added). 
 11. Gilsenan states, 
It is no accident that the holy towns one finds throughout the Middle East . . . are 
also often the sites of major regional markets and caravan route stopping points. 
Religion and economy here link tightly and those who are sanctified men of peace, 
perhaps descendents of the Prophet, guarantee the functioning of the social system 
of the men of honor and violence. They extend a symbolic canopy of religious 
sanctions and symbols over the market and impose, at least in theory, a qualitatively 
different order and code upon those who come together there. 
 MICHAEL GILSENAN, RECOGNIZING ISLAM: RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN THE MODERN 
MIDDLE EAST 175 (rev. ed., I.B.Tauris & Co. 2000) (1982). 
 12. The term “non-Muslim country” or “non-Muslim society” is used in this Essay to 
denote a nation where Islam is a minority faith and not necessarily one in which Islam is absent 
altogether. 
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honor and good faith are as crucial there as are the niceties of local 
forms of accounting. Transactions are marked by language in which 
reiterations of pious formulas and the swearing of religious oaths 
on the Quran and by the Prophet are an integral part.13 
Thus, the dominant economic values of profit maximization, 
market efficiency, and subjective valuation found in democratic-
capitalist societies are not absent in Muslim culture. Rather, they are 
consistently subordinated to a perceived greater good—the 
preservation of Islamic traditions.14 Indeed, Islamic traders of the last 
millennium’s middle centuries have been characterized as the “first 
globalizers,” who spread not only the material goods but also the 
religion and culture of the Arab world to much of Europe and Asia. 
In more recent times, however, many Muslims perceive trade 
liberalization as a threat to Islamic cultural traditions. Ironically, this 
perception of threat began to escalate dramatically during one of the 
most financially prosperous times in the history of Arab-Muslim 
states—the oil boom of the 1970s. Daniel Pipes summarizes the 
means by which prosperity driven by oil exports amplified both the 
allure and the threat of Western culture to Muslim society, and thus 
precipitated a retreat to Islamic fundamentalism: 
 Increased exposure to the West and to modernity made Muslims 
more receptive to fundamentalist Islam. Oil revenues led to 
urbanization, it attracted foreign non-Muslim workers, it made 
Western manufactured products more available; and it funded 
travel to the West for Muslim students, businessmen, and tourists. 
In these and other ways, the oil boom brought many Muslims into 
closer contact with modernity. As oil increased Muslim contact 
with the West, many believers reacted by turning inward. They 
 
 13. GILSENAN, supra note 11, at 177 (emphasis added). Scholar of Islam John Esposito 
also notes significance in the proximity between market and mosque in Muslim societies, 
stating: “Mosques throughout the world, such as the Umayyad mosque in Damascus and the 
magnificent mosques of old Cairo and Teheran, are often adjoined by magnificent bazaars. 
Traders and businessmen were among the most successful sectors in society and were 
responsible for the spread of their faith.” JOHN ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE 
NAME OF ISLAM 129 (2002). 
 14. Kuran states, perhaps too negatively and too strongly, that the “real purpose [of 
Islamic economics] is to help prevent Muslims from assimilating into the emerging global 
culture whose core elements have a Western pedigree.” Kuran, supra note 10, at 438. As will 
be seen, there is some flexibility in Islam respecting assimilation so long as the core values of 
the religious tradition are not lost in the process. 
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sought refuge in their own tradition rather than contend with the 
threatening impact of modern culture.15 
The vast oil reserves of many Arab-Muslim countries, offering an 
irresistible allure for industrialized nations, inspired an equally 
irresistible attraction for the Islamic nations to tap the wealth that oil 
represented. But this required the involvement of Western 
corporations, the implementation of high technologies, and the 
adoption of certain Western business practices, all of which 
precipitated a larger infusion of Western values. It is this ostensible 
infusion of Western values that is perceived to endanger traditional 
values and practices of Islam today and that has fueled the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
This perception of threat was evidenced during a recent protest 
in Iran in response to a meeting of Iranian government ministers 
who came together to discuss the issue of trade. The protesters 
stated that the “[g]lobal economy is the domination of the West. 
The cultural domination should be demolished. World workers 
unite, unite and death to the Zionist capitalism . . . .”16 A written 
statement issued by the demonstrators observed, “The accelerated 
pace of globalization is so high that the justice-seeking revolution of 
the Iranian people has fallen pray [sic] to this current as it has 
inflicted its first blows on the nation in the form of a structural 
reform plan . . . .”17 
Two observations are immediately apparent in the protests of the 
Iranian demonstrators. First, their claim that the “[g]lobal economy 
is the domination of the West”18 supports the stereotype that 
Muslims are resistant to globalization. For many fundamentalist and 
traditionalist groups within Islam, the term globalization is simply a 
euphemistic cover for more insidious forms of Westernization. 
Several Islamic leaders and scholars have attempted to emphasize 
that it is not globalization they fear but rather Westernization or, 
more pointedly, Americanization,19 yet the very dominance of the 
 
 15. DANIEL PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD: ISLAM AND POLITICAL POWER 297 
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1983). 
 16. Iranian Workers Rally Against WTO, Globalization, at http://www.payvand.com/ 
news/01/nov/1019.html (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Mark Long, director of Middle Eastern Studies at Baylor University, comments that 
in conversations with many mainstream Muslim leaders, a majority have quickly pointed out 
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American economy in the world lends itself to such easy association. 
International financial institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) and World Bank are often viewed as nothing 
more than puppet organizations of Western governments, erected to 
impose their values on the developing world. 
Second, and more significant in the context of this Essay, the 
protesters were demonstrating against the acts of their own 
government as much as against any perceived infringements by 
Western institutions. This protest, in what is ostensibly one of the 
most anti-Western of Islamic nations, represents profound divisions 
in Muslim attitudes over the effects of globalization. Those attitudes 
run the gamut from genuine enthusiasm by many Muslim political 
leaders over the prospects for the global economy to alleviate poverty 
in their countries to qualified optimism by members of the middle 
class who observe both the good and bad of global capitalism to 
bitter hatred of the emerging world economy by fundamentalist 
clerics and militant Muslim students in the madrasas (Islamic 
schools). 
Significantly, leaders of several Muslim countries, even those 
viewed as extreme in the West such as Iran and Libya, have voiced 
support for the economic aspects of globalization as a means of 
extricating their countries from the unrelenting cycle of poverty.20 
Professor Mohammad Ali Sa’adat, head of the Iranian embassy’s 
cultural office, has observed the inevitability of the globalization 
phenomenon and its potential as a force for the empowerment of 
Muslims: 
We should accept globalization as a fact. It is difficult to say 
whether it is good or bad, but the modern world is moving 
towards globalization and the development of high technology. 
Taking their own high potential as a starting point, the Western 
countries are attempting to impose their own cultures and values. 
As a counterweight to this, we, the Muslim countries, should 
 
that it is the presumed dominance of one nation or political ideology over all others that they 
fear, not the confluence and compression of global values and practices that serves here as a 
working definition for globalization. Interview with Mark Long, Director of Baylor 
University’s Middle Eastern Studies, in Waco, Tex. (Sept. 23, 2002). 
 20. See Interconfessional Dialogue Will Promote Stability, BBC MONITORING INT’L 
REP., June 20, 2002. 
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promote the development of integration and the formation of a 
world culture.21 
Similarly, Jordanian King Abdallah has stated, “In light of 
globalization, Arabs should have their economic bloc that promotes 
inter-Arab trade and [Arabs should] remove obstacles facing the flow 
of trade, thus achieving a dignified life for our peoples.”22 The 
statements of Sa’adat and Abdallah reveal an attitude more common 
among Muslim political and religious leaders and intellectuals than 
most Westerners comprehend: That given a fair playing field among 
the world’s diverse cultures, many Muslims welcome the opportunity 
to reveal the virtues of Islamic society afforded through the forces of 
globalization. M. A. Muqtedar Khan believes those virtues “such as 
adl (justice), zakaat (distributive justice) israf (prohibition of 
extravagance), [and] falah (welfare)” have been ignored or 
marginalized in the economic realm due to the preoccupation of 
scholars with the Quran’s prohibition on usury.23 Khan’s article 
demonstrates “how East Asian economies have [been] 
institutionalizing Islamic principles in contemporary economic 
practices and are harvesting great benefits.”24 Yet, Khan and others 
suggest that achieving a “fair playing field” in which these Islamic 
economic virtues can be demonstrated to a rapidly changing global 
culture will require the reform of certain international institutions 
and the reorientation of globalizing influences away from its current 
Western bias and in favor of a truly multicultural approach.25 
Hence, it is suggested that a misperception exists on the part of 
many non-Muslims about Islamic attitudes toward globalization. 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Jordanian King Praises US President’s Middle East Initiative, BBC MONITORING 
INT’L REP., June 29, 2002. 
 23. M. A. Muqtedar Khan, Mythology of Islamic Economics and Theology of the East Asian 
Economic Miracle, WITNESS-PIONEER, at http://www.wponline.org/vil/Articles/economics/ 
mythology_of_islamic_economics.htm (last visited on Mar. 7, 2003). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Non-Muslim observers are beginning to recognize differences in Muslim attitudes 
between globalization, modernization, and Westernization. Dr. Michael Donovan of the 
Center for Defense Information suggests that within Saudi Arabia, “more moderate groups 
stress reform, rejecting Westernization rather than modernization. They understand that 
Islamic society will have to accommodate the modern world in some respects. They wish to 
mitigate the more problematic influences of modernity through a revival of traditional Islamic 
values.” Michael Donovan, Islam and Stability in Saudi Arabia, CENTER FOR DEFENSE 
INFORMATION, at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/saudi.cfm (Nov. 13, 2001). 
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The stereotype of militant Islamic groups resisting global institutions 
by force is greatly attenuated by the stated views of many mainstream 
Muslim leaders who confess resignation to the inevitable formation 
of a global community. Indeed, statements by prominent Americans 
such as television evangelist/political commentator Pat Robertson 
that Western and Muslim culture are so antithetical that “to see 
Americans become followers of quote Islam, is nothing short of 
insanity”26 reveal a lack of understanding and even unwillingness by 
Western critics to genuinely explore Muslim values and attitudes. 
Encouragingly, some observers are beginning to recognize that 
the arrival of the global economy may signal an attenuation of one of 
the principal impediments to the improvement of Muslim relations 
with the West—the disparity in their respective standards of material 
life. Columnist Tom Friedman, for example, has noted “the ‘contrast 
between Islam’s self-perception as the most ideal expression of the 
world’s three great monotheistic religions . . . and the conditions of 
poverty, repression, and underdevelopment in which most Muslims 
live today.’”27 Friedman’s observation that it is incongruous for 
nations with the supposedly “purest” form of monotheism to have 
realized extreme material deprivation reveals an obvious Western bias 
concerning the natural confluence of prosperity and religiosity. Still, 
it leads him to his often-espoused idea that if bringing Islamic 
nations to a fuller participation in the world economy is successful in 
helping them shed their economic inferiority complexes, then 
economic globalization can serve both to harmonize and stabilize a 
transforming world community.28 
A potential obstacle to Islam’s acquiescence to a global economy, 
however, is whether Muslims can accept certain principles now 
viewed as essential to the effective operation of the capitalist 
economy, both national and international. For example, the modern 
capitalistic imperative of economic subjectivism (the idea that given a 
 
 26. Press Release, The Interfaith Alliance, Robertson Calls Islam “Nothing Short of 
Insanity” (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.interfaithalliance.org/Newsroom/press/ 
102997.html (quoting The 700 Club (Christian Broadcasting Network television broadcast, 
Oct. 27, 1997)). Robertson continued by stating, “[T]he Islamic people, the Arabs, were the 
ones who captured Africans, put them into slavery, and sent them to America as slaves. Why 
would people want to embrace the religion of the slavers?” Id. 
 27. Martin Krossel, Friedman’s Follies: All the Peace-Processing That’s Fit to Print, THE 
WKLY. STANDARD, May 27, 2002, at 17 (quoting Thomas Friedman, An Intriguing Signal 
from the Saudi Crown Prince, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, §4, at 11). 
 28. See id. 
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culture of markets and the freedom to transact, the subjective 
choices of individuals are the principal source of values for society 
and the primary guide to the social good) appears to conflict with 
traditional Islamic views of community and the role of the individual. 
Given the emphasis on communal values and restrictions on 
individual autonomy found in many Muslim societies, it is fair to ask 
whether a subjectivist economic ethic can exist and function in an 
Islamic culture in the same way that it has in the industrialized and 
technological economies of the West. 
In describing Islam’s struggle with such questions, Kuran’s The 
Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality chronicles certain changes 
that have taken place in the Muslim world to accommodate the 
requirements of the modern global economy.29 For example, Kuran 
notes that the Islamic banking system has adjusted to the 
requirement for some form of return on capital to enable investment 
while attempting to adhere to the Islamic prohibition on usury. 
Islamic banks charge what are termed “markup” fees and 
“commissions” in lieu of actual interest charges for monetary loans; 
yet the effect of these transfers is the same—the payment of an 
agreed upon sum for the use of money for a specified period of 
time.30 Kuran observes, 
The Islamic banks create uneasiness in their employees who 
understand that their operations do not really conform to the ban 
on interest. At the same time, they serve as an instrument of guilt- 
reduction for depositors and borrowers who believe that, even if 
Islamic banking is not actually interest-free, it is at least morally 
superior to conventional banking.31 
Thus, some flexibility is evident among certain Muslim groups in 
their dealings with the increasingly complex world economy. As Ray 
Takeyh has observed, “Moderate Islamists are likely to be most 
liberal in the realm of economic policy. The failure of command 
economies in the Middle East and the centrality of global markets to 
the region’s economic rehabilitation have made minimal government 
 
 29. See Kuran, supra note 10. 
 30. Id. at 441. Kuran notes, however, that this practice, obviously instituted to 
circumvent religious prohibitions, is an “exception”; it is a significant concession to the 
requirements of an expanding world economy. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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intervention appealing to Islamist theoreticians.”32 Moreover, there 
have been attempts in recent years to “Islamicize” certain institutions 
and principles of the modern capitalist economy. Stock and bond 
trading, for example, has been legitimated through the application of 
the Shari’a to such practices and facilitated through the advent of an 
“Islamic Web site [sic] for Sharia-compliant stock trading.”33 The 
growth in Muslim investment websites and newsletters would 
indicate that activities associated with global financial markets are 
gaining acceptability with at least some Islamic groups so long as 
these activities are deemed to comply with the dictates of Shari’a.34 
The periodical Islamic Voice published an editorial that is critical 
of the fact that certain Muslim groups now look primarily to the 
final products and services of corporations to identify them as Halal 
(permitted, licit) while ignoring their underlying debt and 
investment structures, which are often dependent on interest-bearing 
instruments.35 Again, this criticism reveals that influential groups 
within Islamic culture are finding ways to adopt modern economic 
principles and practices that traditionally have been viewed as 
incompatible with the Muslim religion. 
Other symbolic and anecdotal evidence exists to suggest the 
rising acceptance of global economic principles by Muslims. The very 
existence of the Petronas towers, the world’s largest skyscrapers 
located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which were financed by the 
Petronas National Oil Company as an effort to “announc[e] Kuala 
 
 32. Ray Takeyh, Faith-Based Initiatives: Can Islam Bring Democracy to the Middle East?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 68, 70. 
 33. Ela Dutt, Islamic Web Site for Sharia-compliant stock trading, INDIA ABROAD NEWS 
SERVICE, at http://www.apnic.net/mailing-lists/s-asia-it/archive/2001/01/msg00035.html 
(Jan. 11, 2001). Shari’a is the divine law of the Islamic faith that guides humankind according 
to God’s will. It is not simply a moral code; its laws are relevant to all aspects of life, for 
Muslims and non-Muslims as well. 
 34. The website Muslim Investor offers a screening filter to enable its Muslim clients to 
purchase Shari’a compliant stocks. See http://muslim-investor.com/mi/islamic-filter.phtml, 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2003). A Dow Jones Islamic Market Index also has been created that 
includes only stocks of companies whose products, services, and business practices have been 
determined to be in compliance with Islamic law. For more on the recent expansion of Islamic 
investing, see Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah: Devout Muslims Don’t Pay or Receive Interest. So 
How Can Their Financial System Work?, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002, at 155. 
 35. For a fascinating discussion of the intra-Muslim debate over Halal businesses and 
the attempts by Islamic groups to accommodate the demands of the global economy, see 
Trading in Stocks, ISLAMIC VOICE, at http://www.islamicvoice.com/december.98/ 
editorial.htm (Dec. 1998). 
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Lumpur’s prominence as a commercial and cultural capital,”36 serves 
as a potent symbol that an advanced form of capitalism can thrive 
within a predominantly Muslim country. Moreover, the dramatic rise 
of the Islamic banking system, which saw the first Muslim bank 
established only in 1975 and now includes approximately 200 
financial institutions with total assets of around $170 billion,37 serves 
as further evidence of Muslim acceptance of central institutions of 
capitalism. 
Yet, these inroads into Muslim society created by the pervasive 
and unyielding nature of global forces undoubtedly have precipitated 
much of the tension that is observed in relations between Islam and 
the West. That tension will continue to force confrontations like the 
one observed in the Iranian protest noted previously until some 
agreement is reached over the degree of autonomy that communities 
can expect in the global society. This “agreement” between Western 
and Muslim countries will require facilitation by international 
institutions that are perceived as unbiased; even more important will 
be implicit and quite subtle economic arrangements in which both 
sides come to terms with the differences that separate their respective 
cultures and adjust their policies accordingly. 
The demands of a global economic order undoubtedly will 
continue to pressure Islamic nations to conformity. However, it is 
suggested that the angst experienced by Muslims in their encounters 
with the world economy serves as an experiment that can also be of 
great value to the West. In an age in which the citizens of capitalist 
countries are beginning to question whether their economic system 
can continue to prosper even as religious and moral institutions are 
increasingly marginalized,38 the gradual adoption of global capitalism 
 
 36. The Petronas Towers, in THE WORLD’S TALLEST TOWERS, at http:// 
www.skyscraper.org/tallest/t_petronas.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). The building, designed 
by Cesar Pelli, expresses “the culture and heritage of Malaysia by evoking Islamic arabesques 
and employing repetitive geometries characteristic of Muslim architecture. In plan, an 8-point 
star formed by intersecting squares is an obvious reference to Islamic design; curved and 
pointed bays create a scalloped facade that suggests temple towers.” Id. 
 37. Simeon Kerr, Online Trading Comes to Islam, SHIA NEWS, at http://www. 
shianews.com/hi/articles/business/0000054.php (Feb. 13 2001). 
 38. Social theorist Fred Hirsch explored the emergence and negative consequences of 
what he termed “micromorality”—a form of moral reductionism in Western culture that was 
realized as “the utilitarian-consumerist view of man banished from the social plane the explicit 
moral content that was embodied in Christian philosophy and sought after in Marxist and 
other socialist thought.” FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 124, 132 (1976). 
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by Islamic societies will likely illuminate both the capabilities and 
limitations of religious voice in the global economy. For Western 
culture, often portrayed as having become desensitized to its own 
eroding moral foundations, Islam’s struggles can help to expose 
moral failings that have resulted from the West’s rise to economic 
dominance. The Islamic economic experiment currently underway 
can also serve as a test of the potential of capitalism to be a source of 
virtue and moral renewal as many economically conservative 
Christians have contended.39 
The Islamic encounter with the global economy also serves as an 
interesting experiment in another sense that is perhaps best phrased 
in the form of a question: Can capitalism function effectively in 
societies where religious and moral institutions exhibit substantial 
control over their members’ participation in a modern, technological 
economy? Certainly, to the extent that individual choice is controlled 
by any authoritarian institution, one can theorize that the economy 
of such a society will come to resemble the centralized planning 
system of collectivism.40 However, the nature of control over 
personal behavior exercised by the institutions of the Islamic faith 
varies widely among and even within Muslim nations. What specific 
form or forms Islamic economics will take in the new world order 
remains to be seen; however, the trends identified here suggest that 
trade liberalism, an expansion of capital markets, and a greater 
receptivity to financial and industrial development likely will be 
included as integral, though controversial, components. 
III. POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION 
Resistance to the adoption of liberal principles of governance in 
Islamic societies undoubtedly has been conditioned by past 
experience. Coercive attempts to spread democratic values and 
 
 39. Christian libertarians and neoconservatives such as Michael Novak, Ronald Nash, 
and Father Robert Sirico have often praised the virtue-generating capabilities of capitalist 
economies. The present author explores the views of these and other American Christians who 
contend that capitalism largely reinforces moral virtue in his unpublished dissertation: Charles 
McDaniel, Reinhold Niebuhr’s Economic Realism: A Critical Response to Austrian 
Subjectivism in American Christian Economic Thought (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Baylor University) (on file with author). 
 40. “Collectivism” refers to socialist and communist systems in which private ownership 
has been abolished in favor of collective rights to property and in which a central planning 
system rather than the market guides the production of goods and services. 
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practices to Muslim countries in the period of European colonization 
and later in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the Cold War effort 
resulted in the rise of anti-Western attitudes, oppressive regimes, and 
Islamic fundamentalist movements.41 The Iranian Revolution of 
1979 revealed for Americans the consequences of attempts to force 
elements of Western culture on a predominantly Islamic society. 
Similarly, the intensity of secularization in Turkey implemented 
under Kemal Atatürk in the 1930s and 1940s ultimately precipitated 
a fundamentalist response by various Islamist groups in that country, 
beginning with Necmettin Erbakan’s Party for National Order in 
1970.42 The stark divisions that exist within Turkish society are the 
result of what was perhaps the most aggressive attempt to secularize 
a predominantly Muslim culture in history. Hakan Yavuz observes 
the rift in contemporary Turkish culture created by Kemalism and its 
confrontational approach to the institution of Western values and 
democratic principles: 
The soul of white Turkey and its Kemalist identity is in constant 
pain and conflict with the national body politic of Turkey. Each 
side has its own discursive field. For the white Turks, identity is 
based on the ideology of militant anti-religious secularism, known 
in this case as Kemalism, or laïcism. Islam, on the other hand, has 
 
 41. Gilsenan traces the roots of modern class divisions in the Middle East to the rise of 
the European inspired “colonial city.” Gilsenan observes that as 
[M]embers of the new bourgeoisie and those members of the merchant classes who 
were successfully incorporated into the emerging economic and social order moved 
out of their old urban quarters into the new residential suburban spaces, so too 
social and cultural separation between classes grew greater and greater, even as their 
interdependency through the services sector became more intensive. 
GILSENAN, supra note 11, at 200. Moreover, 
Islam was, of course, rigorously excluded from the colonial city, which specifically 
rejected signs of what was the faith of the subject classes while installing all the 
marks of the late-nineteenth-century European cosmos of state, church, and 
technology. But in the precolonial town the sacred (Islamic) order played a major 
part in articulating spatial forms, as it still does where those areas remain significant 
in contemporary Middle Eastern cities. 
Id. at 201. 
 42. PIPES, supra note 15, at 240. Pipes notes: 
Atatürk did all he could to Westernize Turkey, for example, replacing Turkish words 
of Arabic and Persian origin with words of French derivation; he even installed pews 
in the mosques. After his death in 1938, the secularist legacy was carried on by the 
military. Keeping Islam out of politics required constant vigilance on its part, to the 
point that the soldiers made Atatürk’s program into something resembling a civil 
religion. 
Id. 
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provided the vernacular for the marginalized majority, who were 
excluded from the top-down transformation. While secular 
discourse seeks to empower the state, Islamism empowers the 
excluded black Turks and Kurds.43 
Yavuz goes on to note core problems in the socio-political 
character of Kemalism that have contributed to the problems facing 
modern Turkey, the first of which is that “its uncritical 
modernization ideology prevents open discussion that would lead to 
a new and inclusive social contract that recognizes the cultural 
diversity of Turkey.”44 Yavuz’s observation of the Kemalists’ methods 
and their consequences can be abstracted to a more generalized fear 
in the Islamic world of the nature of globalization itself. In other 
words, Islamic societies fear that modernizing elements inevitably 
overwhelm traditional ones and prevent the formation of what could 
be distinctive social contracts that have the potential to embrace the 
rich diversity of Islamic culture. It is not the idea of globalization 
that Muslims fear but rather the cold reality of its implementation, or 
at least their perception of that implementation. 
Nevertheless, other scholars have pointed to Turkey as a political 
model for Islamic countries in their often painful transitions to more 
democratic structures. Graham Fuller, for example, has stated that 
Turkey merits emulation 
not because Turkey is “secular”; in fact, Turkish “secularism” is 
actually based on total state control and even repression of religion. 
Turkey is becoming a model precisely because Turkish democracy 
is beating back rigid state ideology and slowly and reluctantly 
permitting the emergence of Islamist movements and parties that 
reflect tradition, a large segment of public opinion, and the 
country’s developing democratic spirit.45 
The Turkish struggle to “adopt” democratic principles illustrates 
that democracy only takes hold where its values reach the masses and 
where its specific form is flexible enough to conform to certain 
preeminent cultural values. The West must recognize that its 
democratic governments are not the only types of democracy; a 
 
 43. M. Hakan Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere, 54 J. INT’L AFF. 21, 26 
(2000). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 
48, 59. 
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democracy’s unique political form is as flexible and variable as the 
representative assemblies and constitutions of the world. And, in the 
specific context of Islam, Western leaders must recognize that, as 
Fuller has stated, “political Islam, or Islamism—defined broadly as 
the belief that the Koran and the Hadith . . . have something 
important to say about the way society and governance should be 
ordered—remains the most powerful ideological force in that part of 
the world.”46 
Yet Fuller’s statement does not suggest that Islamic principles of 
governance are fundamentally undemocratic. Some scholars in fact 
suggest that the principal difference is not between Muslim political 
philosophy and democracy but rather between distinctive Islamic and 
Western conceptions of democracy. Ali Abootalebi, in his article 
Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, attempts to make this point by 
paraphrasing Abdul A’la Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a 
group widely characterized in the West as a “radical” Islamic 
organization. According to Abootalebi, Mawdudi believed that “if 
democracy is conceived as a limited form of popular sovereignty, 
restricted and directed by God’s law, there is no incompatibility with 
Islam . . . .”47 However, Abootalebi goes on to observe Mawdudi’s 
conclusion that “Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western 
democracy [that is] based solely on the sovereignty of the people.”48 
While it can be argued that Abootalebi’s characterization of 
Mawdudi’s philosophy overemphasized the role of popular 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the sovereignty of the Creator in Western 
democracy, this perceived difference carries considerable weight in 
Muslim political thought. It is reinforced, for example, on the 
website of Jamaat-e-Islami, which attempts to differentiate Islamic 
and Western understandings of democracy rather than attacking the 
idea of democracy itself: 
What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy, 
therefor [sic], is that the latter is based on the concept of popular 
sovereignty, while the former rests on the principle of popular 
Khilafa. In Western democracy, the people are sovereign; in Islam 
sovereignty is vested in Allah and the people are His caliphs or 
 
 46. Id. at 49. 
 47. Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, 3 MIDDLE E. REV. OF INT’L AFF. 
J., Mar. 1999, at 14, 15, available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/abootalebi.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2003). 
 48. Id. (emphasis added). 
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representatives. In the former the people make their own [laws]; in 
the latter they have to follow and obey the laws (shari’a) given by 
Allah through His Prophet. In one the government undertakes to 
fulfil [sic] the will of the people; in the other the government and 
the people have to fulfil [sic] the will of Allah.49 
Two prominent scholars of Islam, John Voll and John Esposito, 
contend that three “longstanding Islamic concepts of consultation 
(shurah), consensus (ijma), and independent interpretive judgment 
(ijtihad)” are critical to the development of Islamic democracy.50 
Significantly, the authors find support for all three principles in the 
Quran, although they suggest “the classical doctrine of shurah, as it 
developed, was in error.”51 Likely due to the aristocratic and 
authoritarian nature of the caliphates, the concept of shurah 
developed culturally as “the process of one person, the ruler, asking 
other people for advice, whereas the Quranic understanding of 
shurah ‘does not mean that one person asks others for advice but, 
rather, mutual advice through mutual discussions on an equal 
footing.’”52 
A return to the Quranic ideal of shurah has been evidenced in 
several Muslim countries in recent decades as has a greater 
appreciation of the principle of ijtihad. Renowned Muslim 
philosopher-poet Muhammad Iqbal in fact noted rising appreciation 
for the value of independent spirit and judgment along with growth 
in the concept of representative government among Muslims as early 
as the 1930s: 
The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of 
legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in 
advance. The transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual 
representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in 
 
 49. Syed Abul A’la Maudoodi, The Political Framework of Islam, ISLAMIC 
FOUNDATION, at http://www.jamaat.org/islam/HumanRightsPolitical.html (Ahmed Said 
Khan & Khurshid Ahmad trans., last visited Feb. 6, 2003). 
 50. JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN O. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 27 (1996). Voll and 
Esposito concede that “[l]ike many concepts in Western political tradition, these terms have 
not always been identified with democratic institutions and have a variety of usages in 
contemporary Muslim discourse. However, regardless of other contexts and usages, these 
terms are central to the debates and discussions regarding democratizations in Muslim 
societies.” Id. 
 51. Id. at 28. 
 52. Id. (quoting Fazlur Rahman, The Principle of Shura and the Role of the Ummah in 
Islam, in STATE, POLITICS, AND ISLAM 90–91 (Mumtaz Ahmad ed., 1986)). 
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view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only form Ijma can 
take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion 
from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. In 
this way alone can we stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in 
our legal system.53 
Interestingly, this growing respect for democratic principles is 
observed not only among the more secular segments of Muslim 
populations but also among certain Islamist groups that are 
committed to the incorporation of Quranic principles into whatever 
form of governance their countries adopt. Providing contemporary 
evidence that supports Iqbal’s observations, Mumtaz Ahmad, 
professor of political science at Hampton University, notes: 
The Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish, Malaysian, Egyptian, 
Jordanian, Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan Islamists have already 
accepted the Islamic legitimacy of popular elections, the electoral 
process, the multiplicity of political parties and even the authority 
of the popularly-elected parliament to legislate not only on socio-
economic matters but also on Islamic doctrinal issues.54 
These concessions suggest that the governments of Muslim countries 
will continue to explore and experiment with various elements of 
democratic government in the attempt to discover critical synergies 
between democracy, the traditions of Islamic culture, and the 
dictates of Islamic law. 
Hence, just as in the case of economic globalization, it appears 
that there may be much broader support for the adoption of 
democratic principles within Muslim nations than many Western 
critics are willing to acknowledge. Some moderate Islamist groups, 
which increasingly concede the inevitability of a global “economy,” 
also acknowledge a newfound commitment to some form of 
representative and constitutional government. Ironically, it is the 
Islamists rather than the secular factions who may point the way to 
conciliation between Muslim countries and the West over the issue 
of democratic governance. For example, one scholar has noted that, 
among Islamists, 
 
 53. Id. at 29 (quoting ALLAMA MUHAMMAD IQBAL, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ISLAM 173–74 (1968)). 
 54. Mumtaz Ahmad, Islam and Democracy: The Emerging Consensus – ii, MILLI 
GAZETTE, at http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/01022002/0102200259.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2003). 
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It is the extent of popular sovereignty and not its existence that is 
debated. Because of economic, technological, and environmental 
changes, further development of Shari’a seems inevitable to the 
Islamists. The development of Shari’a, they argue, need not be 
looked upon as a move away from Islamic principles, but, on the 
contrary, as a necessary stepping-stone towards reaching an ideal 
Islamic society—a materially and spiritually developed utopia.55 
While the lessons of history might argue against utopian 
aspirations for any system emerging from a convergence among the 
institutions of religion and state, such statements are nonetheless 
encouraging for a world community that is locked in ideological 
conflict. And, once again, comments such as these from significant 
Muslim thinkers like Iqbal and Abootalebi point out the potential 
damage caused by the lethargy and ill-founded rhetoric of Western 
pundits who all-too-casually accept the clash of civilizations thesis 
and the stereotypes emanating from it. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS GLOBALIZATION 
The issue of emerging international standards for human rights 
perhaps poses more obstacles to Islam’s acceptance of and 
acceptance within the global community than either economic or 
political globalization. The spread of Western-style individualism to 
the non-Western world that has been associated with the growth of 
international political and economic institutions has been more 
heavily criticized by Islamic groups than the institutions themselves. 
Muslim social theorist Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani, for 
example, condemns the extreme ethic of consumption that many 
perceive as fully ingrained in the Western conception of the 
individual: 
One who has adopted useless or harmful ways of consumption and 
then becomes habituated to them will always be using his mind to 
seek out illicit sources of income; gradually he will find his way into 
the practices of stealing, embezzlement, and usurpation of public 
and private resources. As these forms of consumption increase, the 
production facilities for the corresponding goods expand 
proportionately (as for beverages, corrupting films, tobacco 
products, centers of corruption, deviant art forms, etc.), and the 
production faculties for sound, useful, necessary goods likewise are 
 
 55. Abootalebi, supra note 47, at 17. 
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diminished proportionately. Productive capacities and human 
resources retreat from the course of social and intellectual 
evolution. Finally, a material and spiritual poverty envelops 
individuals and society, leading to the darkness of loss of life and 
general extinction.56 
Taleghani’s gloom over the prospects of a society of unbridled 
consumption is not uncommon in the Muslim world. While many 
Muslims are more subtle in their criticisms of Western individualism 
and its ethic of consumption, the question should be asked: Is there 
something distinctive in Islamic conceptions of human rights and 
responsibilities that gives rise to vehement criticism of Western 
notions? Perhaps more fundamentally, is there a consistently agreed 
upon understanding of individual rights in the Islamic world that can 
be expressed and thus compared to the Western view? 
The Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan offers one perspective on human 
rights in the context of Muslim culture that suggests, at the very 
least, less temporality than the Western understanding: “When we 
speak of human rights in Islam we mean those rights granted by 
Allah. Rights granted by kings or legislative assemblies can be 
withdrawn as easily as they are conferred; but no individual and no 
institution has the authority to withdraw the rights conferred by 
Allah.”57 
Moreover, concerning international norms for human rights, the 
same group states, “The charter and the proclamations and the 
resolutions of the United Nations cannot be compared with the 
rights sanctioned by Allah; the former are not obligatory on 
anybody, while the latter are an integral part of the Islamic faith.”58 
Thus, in Islamic political thought there appears to be denial of the 
legitimacy of “rights doctrine” as developed by secular political 
institutions, especially that of the international community. 
Syrian scholar Sati al-Husri agrees that the exaltation of personal 
freedoms found in the West is contrary to the Islamic tradition. 
According to George Mason University professor Adeed Dawisha, 
 
 56. AYATULLAH SAYYID MAHMUD TALEGHANI, SOCIETY AND ECONOMICS IN ISLAM 41 
(R. Campbell trans., 1982). In fairness, Taleghani did not specifically target American or 
European economic ethics in his description, but the influence of the consumption ethic on 
Western individualism has been one of the principal targets of social criticism by Muslim 
scholars. 
 57. Maudoodi, supra note 49. 
 58. Id. 
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al-Husri “rejects the notion of freedom in the Anglo-French 
tradition that regards the state as instrumental in founding the 
nation.”59 For al-Husri, freedom is an “organic creation” that 
renders individual liberties subordinate to the freedom of the people 
collectively.60 It is this elevation of national identity and rights above 
those of the individual that created stumbling blocks to conciliation 
between Islam and the West over human rights issues in the past. 
Attempts to bring Islamic countries into the emerging global 
community already encounter resistance from Muslims over 
differences between Islam’s view of the relationship between the 
individual and society and that of the West. Michael Ignatieff 
describes the frustrations experienced in past attempts to reach 
common ground between Muslim and Western nations over the 
issue of human rights: 
 There have been recurrent attempts, including Islamic 
declarations of human rights, to reconcile Islamic and Western 
traditions by putting more emphasis on family duty and religious 
devotion and by drawing on distinctively Islamic traditions of 
religious and ethnic tolerance. But these attempts at fusion 
between the Islamic world and the West have never been entirely 
successful: agreement by the parties actually trades away what is 
vital to each side. The resulting consensus is bland and 
unconvincing.61 
Ignatieff’s point draws support from the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1947. Concessions made during the 
Declaration’s drafting resulted in a document that many scholars 
concede has had limited efficacy in stemming the tide of persecution 
and repression. Western influence in the Declaration is obvious, 
which has limited the document’s credibility in the Islamic world. At 
the same time, its shortcomings in articulating a truly liberal 
expression of religious liberty have left many human rights activists 
unimpressed and uninspired.62 
 
 59. Dr. Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism & Political Islam: Issues of Identity & 
Problems of Democraticization, Lecture at the University of Maryland (March 28, 2000) 
(summary of lecture at http://www.islam-democracy.org/dawisha_lecture.shtml). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Michael Ignatieff, The Attack on Human Rights, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2001, 
at 102, 103. 
 62. See id. at 106–07. 
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Ignatieff also exposes a subtle undercurrent of Occidental angst 
regarding the historical context of the Universal Declaration. He 
notes that the document was created in the period of European self-
doubt that followed the Holocaust and thus concludes that its 
development “was not so much a proclamation of the superiority of 
European civilization as an attempt to salvage the remains of its 
Enlightenment heritage from the barbarism of a world war just 
concluded.”63 For Ignatieff the very chronology of the Declaration’s 
development signals that it is not so much the imposition of Western 
arrogance “as a warning by Europeans that the rest of the world 
should not reproduce [Western] mistakes.”64 
Indeed, this insistence by the West that Muslims accept the 
Enlightenment basis for human rights as a “starting point” and, in 
the process, learn from Western mistakes is an unrealistic expectation 
that ignores fundamental differences between the cultures. While 
there are examples of documents, such as the United States’ 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution, which have had 
dramatic effects on the cultures that inspired their creation, there are 
other examples of poorly conceived and constructed instruments that 
have engendered hatred and violence. Most of these divisive 
instruments resulted from a lack of understanding of the cultures to 
which the instruments were applied or from external coercion that 
attempted to use these instruments to force foreign institutions on 
resistant populations. 
The West must recognize that human rights globalization is 
largely derivative of the political and economic globalization already 
taking place. Institutions and practices, such as legislative assemblies 
or free markets, as they evolve within the cultures that either create 
or assimilate them, are far more influential than written documents 
in transforming societies. Indeed, many argue that both the 
American Declaration of Independence and Constitution merely 
codified institutions, practices, and attitudes that were largely extant 
in American culture at the time of their development. As often as 
not, rights documents are records of societal changes well underway 
if not fully realized, and they merely reinforce cultural values that 
have already begun to flower. 
 
 63. Id. at 107. 
 64. Id. 
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Moreover, the idea that cultures may simply accept the evolved 
bases of other societies as their starting points for both the 
construction of political structures and a conception of human rights 
is both arrogant and naïve. As siblings must often repeat each others’ 
mistakes and learn from them, so too must cultures follow their own 
unique progressions in the development of cultural values for their 
progress to be meaningful. This observation is not meant to suggest 
that history cannot be instructive; certainly it can and generally it is. 
However, cultural differences as significant as those that exist 
between Islamic and Western societies insist that certain lessons must 
be learned and relearned in each society’s unique cultural milieu.65 
Despite Muslim criticism of Western values and the Western 
conception of individual rights, there are signs that rights-based 
language and values are taking hold in the Muslim world. In regards 
to women’s rights, for example, the literacy rate among females in 
Arab countries has tripled since 1970, and female enrollment in 
primary and secondary schools has more than doubled.66 These and 
other statistics support Islamic scholar Syed Abid Gilani’s contention 
that many common individual and social values exist between 
Western and Islamic societies, among them: “[a]utonomy, vitality, 
education, morality, spiritual contentment, working ethics, social 
harmony, global outlook, [and] religious and social services.”67 
Gilani even goes so far as to identify the roots of constitutional and 
representative government within Islam.68 
This acknowledgement of certain commonalities between 
Western and Muslim conceptions of human rights is not intended 
either to ignore or to trivialize the differences, however. The 
problems encountered in past attempts to craft documents such as 
the Universal Declaration are neither symbolic nor trivial; they 
represent significant rifts between fundamental views of the 
individual and the community in their respective cultures. But these 
differences must be placed into proper perspective. A survey of 
 
 65. Esposito and Voll observe, “[I]t is clear that Muslims are not willing simply to adopt 
Western democratic models. The period of unquestioningly borrowing techniques and 
concepts from Western experience has passed (if it ever took place), and now the effort is to 
establish authentically Islamic democratic systems.” ESPOSITO & VOLL, supra note 50, at 30. 
 66. The Arab World Takes a Hard Look at Itself, WASH. POST, July 14, 2002, at B3. 
 67. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Globalization of Culture, WESTERN VIEWS, at 
http://www.pat.com.pk/newsdesk/globalization_of_culture.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). 
 68. See generally id. 
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history reveals that Muslim culture traditionally has respected 
individual beliefs within certain bounds, and Islamic governments 
today (with some notable exceptions) are more tolerant of religious 
and ethnic minorities than were certain European countries well into 
the twentieth century.69 Moreover, Americans should humbly 
recognize that the current status of Islamic nations with respect to 
individual rights is not unlike its own experience, which has both 
abolished slavery and granted women the right to vote only within 
the past 150 years. 
V. THOUGHTS ON POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
For Western governments, which are now struggling to identify 
groups within Islamic society that are most capable of leading to 
constructive dialogue in the context of the rapid compression of the 
world community, three principal alternatives exist. First, the 
industrial powers of the West can continue past practices of aligning 
themselves with monarchial regimes and secular autocracies such as 
those in Saudi Arabia and Turkey respectively. Second, Western 
governments may forge new associations with the Islamist parties 
that appear to represent a growing cross-section of Islamic society. 
Third, the United States and European foreign policy can shift 
toward the establishment of political ties with more hard-line, 
fundamentalist groups if it is believed that trends within Islam will 
place such groups in power. The potential domestic ramifications of 
a U.S. government move toward alliances with Muslim 
fundamentalist organizations make this third option a virtual moot 
point; thus, the first and second alternatives appear most viable. 
 
 69. Richard Khuri has observed that the principal difference in the perception of 
individual rights between Muslim and non-Muslim nations are the emphases on “positive 
freedom” in the former and “negative freedom” in the latter. RICHARD K. KHURI, FREEDOM, 
MODERNITY, AND ISLAM: TOWARD A CREATIVE SYNTHESIS xx–xxi (1998). Khuri defines 
“negative freedom” as concentrating “on the removal of barriers so that individuals may realize 
their plans, [while] ‘positive’ freedom concentrates on the quality of those ‘plans.’” Id. at xxi. 
European and American systems of negative rights have contributed to a Muslim perception of 
rampant libertinism in Western society while positive freedom as conditioned by Islamic 
institutions leads many Westerners to perceive the concept of Muslim rights as a false freedom, 
coercing the individual into values and practices that are not of his or her choosing. Khuri 
concedes that Islamic theocracy “is likely to sap its [own] moral and spiritual vitality.” Id. at 
xxiii. However, it is equally evident that “the modern [liberal] state has shown itself to be 
inadequate where Islam is best, namely, with regard to the inner life of a society, to what really 
holds it together, to the emotional, moral, and spiritual fabric of life.” Id. Thus, for Khuri, “the 
attainment of freedom requires emphasis on both its negative and positive dimensions.” Id. at xxii. 
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The international embarrassment that the U.S. government has 
suffered recently from revelations of Saudi Arabian ties to terrorist 
activity70 suggests that American support for traditional Arab 
monarchies is not only hypocritical given the American commitment 
to freedom and democratic ideals but also practically unwise. The 
power bases of these monarchies are generally unstable and their lack 
of commitment to human rights and to more equitable distributions 
of wealth in their respective countries only reinforce that instability. 
Moreover, the Iranian debacle of the late 1970s still looms large in 
the American psyche and exerts influence over U.S. policy in the 
Middle East.71 Thus, a continuation of American support for 
monarchial regimes in Muslim states is a failed policy that will only 
experience a continued loss of both moral and political legitimacy. 
Any American or European hopes for significant secularization in 
Islamic countries also appear to be ill-founded. As Ahmad has noted, 
Democratic movements in Muslim societies that are based primarily 
on secular liberalism will have little, if any, prospects of reaching 
the Muslim masses. The West’s fascination with secular elites in the 
Muslim world—perhaps as a counter force to check the Islamists—
is based on two false assumptions: the popular support base of 
secular liberals, and their commitment to the ideals and practices of 
democracy and liberalism.72 
Ahmad uses examples of what he considers failed attempts to 
establish secular governments in Muslim countries like Egypt, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and Algeria to make his point that the popular 
appeal of secular social orders in Muslim countries is near non-
 
 70. For more on the Saudi monarchy’s sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
Hamas in Palestine, as well as its funding of Islamic schools that serve as centers for anti-
Western “indoctrination,” see Ted Galen Carpenter, Terrorist Sponsors: Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, China, CATO INSTITUTE, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/11-16-01.html (Nov. 16, 
2001). 
 71. The United States’ support for the Iranian monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi resulted in 
the capture of 66 Americans at the U.S. Embassy and Foreign Ministry during the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. The Shah’s oppressive policies against popular movements toward both 
democracy and Islamism inspired the Islamic Revolution and, ironically, resulted in the 
installation of a hard-line Shiite government under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeni. 
For interesting comparisons of the events in Iran in 1979 and contemporary developments in 
Saudi Arabia, see John O’Sullivan, Sizing Up the Saudis: Where They Fit In, NAT’L REV., at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/jos/jos022002.shtml (Feb. 20, 2002); and Sam Ghandchi, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia: Monarchies and Islamism, in SELECTED ARTICLES: SAM GHANDCHI, 
FUTURIST at http://www.ghandchi.com/157-Saudi.htm (Aug. 7, 2002). 
 72. Ahmad, supra note 54. 
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existent.73 Inevitably, hard-line military juntas or other authoritarian 
groups emerge in such efforts and attempt to force secular values and 
principles on their polities, which generally results in human rights 
abuses and the incitement of radical opposition.74 
Thus, it appears that new Western alignments with progressive 
Islamist parties are the most practical and culturally respectful way to 
proceed in helping to bring Muslim nations into participation in the 
global society. Yet such a move is politically tricky because, 
ideologically, Islamist groups span a wide continuum from prudent 
to hostile in their acceptance of Western values and practices. Fuller 
notes, “The Islamist phenomenon is hardly uniform . . . ; multiple 
forms of it are spreading, evolving, and diversifying. Today one 
encounters Islamists who may be either radical or moderate, political 
or apolitical, violent or quietist, traditional or modernist, democratic 
or authoritarian.”75 Yet the need exists to categorize this movement 
for it to be appropriately “sold” to the West as an institution capable 
of bringing Muslim nations into the world community. In that 
regard, Bjorn Utvik states, “Perhaps we could best understand the 
Islamists as people acting from within religion, as it were, to defend 
their individual and collective identity against a perceived Western 
onslaught, and to effect a moral and material regeneration in their 
society.”76 As Fuller observes, 
Like it or not . . . various forms of Islamism will be the dominant 
intellectual current in the region for some time to come—and the 
process is still in its infancy. In the end, modern liberal governance 
is more likely to take root through organically evolving liberal 
Islamist trends at the grassroots level than from imported Western 
modules of “instant democracy.”77 
Indeed, the West, having witnessed failed attempts at instant 
democracy (and “instant capitalism”) in former communist 
countries, should apply that lesson to whatever role it may have in 
the emergence of “Muslim democracies.” But if some 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. For details on the abuses created by the formation of a hard-line military junta in the 
specific case of Turkey, see Pipes, supra note 15, at 240–43. 
 75. Fuller, supra note 45, at 49. 
 76. Bjorn O. Utvik, Islamism: The Pious Road to Modernity, in TAMPERE PEACE 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE: RESEARCH REPORT NO. 89, at 258 (Dec. 2001). 
 77. Fuller, supra note 45, at 50. 
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democratization of Islam is essential to an orderly and peaceful 
integration of Muslim states into the global society, non-Muslim 
countries can ill afford to view this process as an all-or-nothing 
proposition. Fuller further observes, “Americans brought up to 
venerate the separation of church and state may wonder whether a 
movement with an explicit religious vision can ever create a 
democratic, tolerant, and pluralistic polity. But if Christian 
Democrats can do it, there is no reason in principle why Islamists 
cannot.”78 A pluralistic democracy in Islamic countries will 
undoubtedly incorporate religious parties into the political process. 
Thus, models from various parts of the world where such systems 
have been institutionalized can help guide Muslim countries in their 
transitions to wider political and economic participation. 
One can agree with Abootalebi that “[a]n ‘Islamic’ democracy 
will not embrace all the secular values adopted in the West”;79 
however, “[t]he incorporation of an institutionalized Islam in the 
process of development will help the cause of democracy should 
Islamists successfully challenge the hegemony of the traditionalists in 
both the religious and political arenas.”80 Abootalebi further insists 
that “Islam need not go through a process of secularization as did 
the West.”81 Similarly, Bjorn Utvik has observed, “Since Islamists do 
not intend to dismantle modernity but to Islamise it, to create an 
alternative modernity, as it were, they must answer the same 
challenges and provide alternative answers to those of the West.”82 
This understanding is equally important to non-Muslim states in 
their dealings with Islamic culture. Expectations that the full suite of 
liberal ideals, values, and practices will be implemented in Muslim 
countries must be lowered and greater respect granted to attempts 
by Muslim nations to preserve their traditions.83 
The salient question is whether Western backing of Islamist 
movements will aid or hinder their progress. The answer to this 
 
 78. Id. at 52. 
 79. Abootalebi, supra note 47, at 21. 
 80. Id. at 21–22. 
 81. Id. at 19. 
 82. Utvik, supra note 76, at 257. 
 83. The systems of Islamic democracy that emerge will, undoubtedly, lack the autonomy 
granted to religious minorities in countries like the United States where institutions of church 
and state are kept at arms length. Yet pressure can be exerted by the West on Muslim countries 
to respect the religious rights of minorities without forcing those countries to accept 
institutions that are likely to destabilize them. 
MCD-FIN 5/31/2003 1:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Year 
536 
question is largely dependent upon Western attitudes and the 
political and diplomatic policies of governments. Western pundits 
who all too casually champion the clashing civilizations thesis do a 
disservice to the world through their intellectual indolence. Ample 
evidence exists that significant constituencies within Islamic societies 
are amenable to many of the changes taking place as a result of 
myriad globalizing influences. Yet there is also abundant evidence to 
suggest that Muslim apprehension over these effects on their 
religious and moral traditions is well founded. Western financial 
institutions especially operate with the stigma of ideological 
hegemony. Some of these institutions must be reformed, some 
perhaps even dismantled, while new institutions committed to true 
“globalization” are constructed with a representative structure that 
engenders the loyalty of the world community. These new 
institutions undoubtedly will test American and European 
commitment to “globalization.” 
Greater acceptance of moderate Islamist groups and the 
reformation of Western institutions are necessary but insufficient 
steps for the improvement of Muslim-Western relations. The greatest 
contribution may well be attitudinal—a genuine willingness on the 
part of democratic-capitalist countries to reflect on their own 
shortcomings. Islam offers the West a mirror for reflection on its past 
and on the myriad ways in which Western society has changed, often 
for the better but at times for the worse. Muslim struggles with 
aspects of global capitalism are not radical, novel, or even beyond 
European and American experience; they are merely new 
instantiations of old tensions. 
That tension between religious convictions and economic 
aspirations has greatly abated in the Western world.84 The 
effortlessness with which the United States and European countries 
knock down religious and moral impediments to “progress” must be 
acknowledged and revisited. This attenuation of moral restraints has 
 
 84. There are, of course, groups for whom this tension between religious belief and 
economic life has not abated. Christian Reconstructionists in the United States, for example, 
believe that structural and “unBiblical” changes in the American economy such as the advent 
of the fractional reserve banking system will ultimately precipitate a financial catastrophe in 
which those Christians who have followed the economic principles offered in the Old 
Testament and, to a lesser extent, the Gospels, will survive and lead the rest of society into a 
more disciplined world of “Christian economics.” For more on the economic ideas of 
Christian Reconstructionists, see GARY NORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN 
ECONOMICS (1973). 
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resulted in a Western culture that now witnesses the rising 
commodification of human life,85 the exacerbation of environmental 
pollution, the extreme concentration of wealth, the “coarsening” 
and “brutalizing” of the “aesthetic and moral environment,”86 and 
what renowned Protestant theologian and social philosopher 
Reinhold Niebuhr termed the “depersonalization of the universe.”87 
Islam’s struggles with usury prohibitions, given the demands of 
the global economy, are reminiscent of early American debates over 
the social and moral effects of mass production and absentee 
ownership.88 America has fought through its angst over the 
theological implications of organ transplantation and fertility 
technologies and now finds itself facing similar questions on the 
religious and moral implications of stem-cell research and human 
cloning with a feeling of inevitability as to their outcomes.89 They 
will become accepted practices if modernity deems them key to the 
survival of civilization. The fact that many Muslims stop short of 
such determinations out of respect for and fidelity to their religious 
tradition is not something that should be ridiculed, vilified, or 
patronized; rather, it should give pause to the nations of the West 
and be cause for deep reflection on the part of non-Muslims. It can 
also serve as the impetus for social, political, and economic change in 
the West if the United States and other countries are willing to assess 
their respective views of progress. 
 
 85. For a discussion of the loss of moral supports for economic progress and the 
commodification of traditionally uncommodifed aspects of human life, see JEAN BETHKE 
ELSHTAIN, WHO ARE WE? 47–48 (2000). 
 86. Conservative-jurist-turned-social-theorist Robert Bork discusses the ways in which 
the “aesthetic and moral environment” is becoming “coarsened and brutalized” in Robert H. 
Bork, Hard Truths About the Culture War, FIRST THINGS, June/July 1995, at 18. 
 87. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, DOES CIVILIZATION NEED RELIGION? 16 (1928). Niebuhr 
feared the loss of the spiritual dimension to human personality resulting from scientific and 
technological advances and concluded that “[t]he fight of personality against nature is 
religion’s first battle.” Id. at 25. See also id. at 6–7. 
 88. Sean Wilentz observes the social and moral trauma caused by these and other 
transformations in the early American economy in his book SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS 
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850 
(1984). 
 89. For a discussion of the attenuation of moral traditions in the face of technological 
advances, see ROGER LINCOLN SHINN, FORCED OPTIONS: SOCIAL DECISIONS FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (1982) and Charles McDaniel, Reinhold Niebuhr’s Economic Realism: A Critical 
Response to Austrian Subjectivism in American Christian Economic Thought (2002) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Baylor University) (on file with author). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The terrorists of 9/11 destroyed lives and buildings with 
horrifying efficiency that was the product of Western technological 
prowess. But they did much more. They further emboldened a 
United States government already convinced of the moral and 
material superiority of its political and economic system as 
determined by its dramatic triumph in the Cold War.90 That 
government has now set about labeling human institutions and 
human beings as good or evil, and it has come to the conclusion that 
the principal way modern Americans should respond to national 
catastrophe is by “consuming more” to keep their economy robust.91 
Moreover, it has convinced Americans that self-reflection is 
synonymous with self-doubt and, thus, unacceptable behavior for the 
world’s last remaining superpower. 
The increasingly dualistic framework that is being constructed for 
American foreign policy and the prominence of colliding civilizations 
theories in academic and journalistic circles have combined to 
increase the distance that separates Muslim and Western cultures. 
However, by ignoring the stereotypes and observing attitudes among 
a greater cross-section of Islamic society, one sees that these cultures 
are not fundamentally and hopelessly at odds over the largely 
democratic-capitalist consensus that is being determined on the 
world stage. Rather, it suggests that the two major cultural forces in 
 
 90. Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japanese Policy Research Institute, asserts that 
many current international tensions result from “the crucial American decision to maintain a 
Cold War posture in a post–Cold War world.” Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of 
American Empire: The U.S. Maintains a Cold War Posture in a New World, 
TOMPAINE.COMMONSENSE (Apr., 28 2000), at http://www.tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ 
ID/3032 (summarizing Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of 
American Empire, Address Before the New America Foundation (Apr. 10, 2000), at 
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=event&EveID=52&DocID=12 ). 
 91. President Bush also called upon Americans to commit to service in their respective 
communities. Nevertheless, a frequently espoused countermeasure to the terrorist acts of 9/11 
articulated not only by the President but by other high-ranking politicians and dignitaries was 
that Americans should go about their lives as usual, traveling, enjoying entertainment, 
shopping, and generally performing their roles as “consumers.” See Soothing Words, ABC News 
at http://more. abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/dailynews/bushspeech011108.html (Nov. 9, 
2001) (summarizing President George W. Bush, Address at the Georgia World Congress 
Center (Nov. 8, 2001)). For a well-balanced treatment of the Bush Administration’s use of 
“good” and “evil” in its rhetoric, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good and Evil: Framing U.S. 
Foreign Policy in Moral Terms, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/ 
archives/2002/11/21/page3/ (Nov. 21, 2002). 
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global politics today, liberal democracy and Islamism, are in different 
stages of development toward not so dissimilar goals. The West 
desires greater moral grounding for its increasingly technological 
societies while the nations of Islam seek to retain their moral 
foundations even as they adopt those political and economic 
institutions and practices that enhance their well-being. 
The emerging consensus, however, even in traditional Islamic 
states, appears to favor market-based economics and at least some 
form of representative government. The outcome of the Cold War is 
being reaffirmed; unfortunately, that reaffirmation is not proceeding 
at the pace desired by the United States and several other Western 
governments. Moreover, it is likely that the form of Islamic 
democracy and economics that emerges will differ from its current 
instantiations in the West. As Takeyh has observed, ultimately “the 
integration of an Islamic democracy into global democratic society 
would depend on the willingness of the West to accept an Islamic 
variant on liberal democracy.”92 Such acceptance will require a 
degree of humility not present in contemporary Western culture. As 
Richard Khuri warns, 
The unabating condescension and superiority with which official 
Western pronouncements pertaining to the Arab Muslim world are 
intoned have made matters worse still. That some Christians in the 
Arab Muslim world, themselves ripe for a reassertion of their 
aspirations, have echoed the tone of those pronouncements and 
assisted in the penetration of modernity has been enough for the 
less subtle among the Muslims to see all Christians in their midst as 
a fifth column—economically, militarily, and culturally.93 
Western attitudes likely will have a significant impact on the type 
of Muslim democracy that emerges. Muslim nations have become 
conditioned to responding to the perceived impositions of Western 
institutions on their societies. As a result, the attitudes and postures 
that European and American elites assume in their interactions with 
Islamic nations as members of the global society will have a critical 
impact on whatever political and economic changes take place in 
those countries. In that regard, Takeyh speculates on the 
characteristics of participatory government in Muslim society: 
 
 92. Takeyh, supra note 32, at 70. 
 93. KHURI, supra note 69, at 289. 
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But what will a prospective Islamic democracy look like? 
Undoubtedly, Islamic democracy will differ in important ways from 
the model that evolved in post-Reformation Europe. Western 
systems elevated the primacy of the individual above the 
community and thus changed the role of religion from that of the 
public conveyor of community values to a private guide for 
individual conscience. In contrast, an Islamic democracy’s attempt 
to balance its emphasis on reverence with the popular desire for 
self-expression will impose certain limits on individual choice. An 
Islamic polity will support fundamental tenets of democracy—
namely, regular elections, separation of powers, an independent 
judiciary, and institutional opposition—but it is unlikely to be a 
libertarian paradise.94 
Nevertheless, the emergence of some form of Islamic democracy, 
however limited, offers the greatest hope for a solution that might 
benefit both Islamic and Western nations and, in the process, avoid a 
possible clash of civilizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94. Takeyh, supra note 32, at 70. 
